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A

BOOK REVIEW

On Courts and
Communication Strategies:
Book Review of Pamela D. Schulz, Courts and Judges on Trial:
Analysing and Managing the Discourses of Disapproval
Andrew J. Cannon

PAMELA D. SCHULZ, COURTS AND JUDGES ON TRIAL: ANALYSING
MANAGING THE DISCOURSES OF DISAPPROVAL. Lit Verlag,
2010, 290 pp. $76.00.

AND

T

his book is a broad-ranging and detailed discussion of the
sometimes fraught relationships between courts, politicians, and the media. The author combines her practical
experience as the first public relations and information officer
with the Courts Administration Authority in South Australia
with in-depth research as a communications analyst. She has
analyzed media and their practices both in Australia and
worldwide. This has revealed much of interest about the motivations and methods of journalists, politicians, and judges, as
well as implications for community confidence in the court
system and the rule of law in modern democracies. Schulz concludes by offering some practical solutions to the problems she
has identified.
Courts have no direct power over citizens and merely mediate executive power by validating arrest on charges, authorizing the exercise of the power of fining or imprisonment, and
quantifying and collecting judgment debts. To effectively perform their work, courts depend upon the confidence of the
public in the judicial process. There are very few judges, and
relatively few cases, especially in the common-law system, so
the overwhelming source of information for the general public
about courts is the media. Yet the media selects the bizarre and
sensational rather than the serious. As Schulz says, “[i]f it
bleeds, it leads,” and content is selected on the basis of the
“four C” principle: courts, cops, crime and conflict.1 Schulz
contends that in a western world of relative safety, the media
and politicians have created a climate of fear of violent crime
to prop up their own relevance. Crime is depicted as a major
problem, and getting “tough on crime” is the simplistic solution. Part of this process is to make stories newsworthy by
finding cases where there is discontent about the result, which
is then beaten up as part of a discourse of disrespect against the
judicial process as a whole. Straight reporting is demoted in
importance in preference for conflict, problems, and denouement.
Schulz notes that courts have used journalists in the role of

Footnotes
1. PAMELA D. SCHULZ, COURTS ON TRIAL: ANALYSING AND MANAGING THE
DISCOURSES OF DISAPPROVAL. 4 (2010).
2. Id. at 46.
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public information officers to better supply information to the
community on the courts’ own terms. However, she considers
that they have not been successful in bringing the generally
good work of courts to the attention of the public. To be effective, courts must have communication strategies that are
proactive and interactive and provide access and feedback
loops through a wide variety of pathways. In addition to a
broad range of communication strategies, courts must become
more directly involved with the public through community
and specialist courts such as drug, mental-health, and firstnation or Nunga courts that link directly with community services.
Schulz develops her discussion through the discipline of
critical discourse analysis. This is a communications study
method that seeks the sometimes unstated meanings in communications by looking for patterns of words and phrases and
their proximity to each other and conversely by what is systematically avoided or suppressed. She identifies a general discourse of disapproval of courts in the media that has developed
into discourses of disrespect, diminution, and direction. This
leaves judicial officers feeling marginalized and threatened,
while politicians have joined in so that they can be seen as
saviors from the problem, which is largely a media construct.
Schulz identifies the use of the technique of “othering,” by
which a small group is branded and demonized so that the
majority can find a sense of unity in coming together with a
sense of rectitude to eject them. This technique, of course, has
a long unhappy history, and the marginalization of the judiciary has always been a first step in the process. In this
instance, the technique has been applied first to criminals who
should be locked away for longer and to judges who fail to do
this.
Her interviews of politicians demonstrate a disconnection
between their stated understanding of and commitment to the
rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. At the same
time, politicians think that the courts need “direction” from
them to address changing community standards, especially in
sentencing matters, which are the fodder of the press.2 They
acknowledge that the judicial role is not to be popular but to
apply the law “without fear or favor, affection or ill will.”3

3. This is the usual common-law judicial oath. See, for example,
Section 11 of the Oaths Act 1936 (SA). See discussion of popularity, SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 112.

Although politicians acknowledge the central importance of
judicial independence in interviews with the author, Schulz
demonstrates that the same approach often is not reflected in
public comments made to the media. While it is the work of
courts to make nuanced decisions in controversial cases, when
they do, this has sometimes been described as “an unelected
and unaccountable judiciary usurping power” (judges are not
elected in Australia or Britain).4 Politicians do emphasize the
need for the language of law and judgments to be accessible,
and from their comments the author draws the need for a
media judge to enter the media arena on behalf of the judiciary.
Schulz has assessed the view of the judges through discourse analysis of interviews of selected judges from all levels
of the judicial hierarchy in Australia and of their speeches.
What emerges is a primary concern about independence, and
parallel to this is an inevitable tension between the judges’
need to have a relationship of confidence with the community
and politicians and the isolation, which is inherent in their
role. They feel misrepresented and misunderstood.
Schulz uses Foucault’s approach to power to suggest that
the widespread formation of a negative response is indicative
of an emerging challenge to power, which she sees as a challenge by elected government to the authority and independence of the judiciary. Who leads this dance between the
media and the politicians is uncertain, but at this ball the judiciary is the wallflower, and anyway, traditionally it would
refuse to dance in this infotainment world of modern media.
The Foucault approach relegates the great events in history to
tipping points preceded by multiple strands of discourse leading inexorably to the inevitable result, and then the tipping
point is exaggerated as the cause when it is largely the result.5
Not to be involved in the discourse is not to exist and is to risk
the loss of relevance, power, and the independence so valued
by the judiciary. At the same time, discourse analysis shows a
judiciary that is protective of its own methods and unwilling to
join public controversy. The author recognizes that a commitment to a rule of law is bound to lead to unpopular decisions.
Indeed, it is the judiciary that stands between a tyranny of the
majority and populist oppression as they moderate the exercise
of governmental power. Schulz identifies an increasing recognition in the judiciary of the need to defend the notions of
independence and the rule of law in the media and to better
educate the community through civics education and similar
means. But many of its members, as is typical with the marginalized “other,” feel powerless and are defensive.
Schulz concludes that in the face of headlines about a court
judgment such as “THIS IS NOT JUSTICE—THIS IS A DISGRACE,” the present role of a journalist information officer,
which entails ensuring accurate information is supplied to
media, holding court open days, giving school tours, and

speaking at community events and the like, is not sufficient.6
She says a fully integrated and sustained communications
strategy is required, starting with using discourse analysis to
identify the misconceptions that need to be countervailed. To
address these misconceptions, the author would have press
judges, who do not sit so they can engage in discussion of public controversies, and communication managers, who ensure
courts do react effectively to community concerns and express
themselves so that they are understood. A range of other measures—such as a roadshow to showcase the sentencing
process, direct access to the community through cameras in
courts, and interactive websites—are recommended to make
the work of courts accessible and to provide contextual information to the few cases the media choose to highlight. Judicial
participation and knowledge of discourse analysis is also suggested to further ideas for better communication.
Criticism of courts is not new. For example, in 1934, the
High Court of Australia granted a writ of habeas corpus7 to
release a left-wing Czech journalist who had been detained as
an illegal immigrant by order of Attorney General Robert
Menzies to prevent him speaking at a conference. In response,
the Sun newspaper railed against the judges: “If the High
Court were given some real work to do the bench would not
have time to argue for days on the exact length of the split in
the hair, and the precise difference between Tweedledum and
Tweedledee.”8
Times now are different. In that case, the editor and the
paper were each fined for contempt,9 which is unlikely to happen now. And today, with the shift of the power from the
nation-state toward corporate interests, some of which have a
worldwide controlling interest in the media, politicians and
media share a new common interest: to maintain a discourse
of threat and sensation and to diminish the judiciary, whose
independence puts the judiciary outside their control.
Neither can it be said that the courts have no blemish. Their
independence gives them control over process and costs, and
they tolerate excessive delay and overindulgent expense on
sometimes irrelevant pretrial processes that have driven the
cost of litigation beyond the reach of the bulk of the community. As Justice Dyson Heydon recently said in the High Court:
The presentation and adjudication of the case in the
courts below do cause it to merit a place in the precedent
books. The reasons for placing it there turn on the
numerous examples it affords of how litigation should
not be conducted or dealt with. The proceedings reveal
a strange alliance. A party which has a duty to assist the
court in achieving certain objectives fails to do so. A
court which has a duty to achieve those objectives does
not achieve them. The torpid languor of one hand
washes the drowsy procrastination of the other.10

4. Id. at 159.
5. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (trans. Alan M.
Sheridan, 1997).
6. This headline ran in the tabloid, The Advertiser, http://www.
adelaidenow.com.au/, on July 30, 2003.
7. R v Wilson; ex parte Kisch (1934) 52 CLR 234.

8. The King v Dunbabin; Ex Parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 434, 436.
9. The paper was fined 200 pounds, and the journalist 50 pounds. Id.
at 448.
10. Aon Risk Services v Australian. Nat’l Univ., (2009) HCA 27, 156,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2009/
27.html.
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Courts must accept valid criticism and be prepared to remedy properly identified problems. However, that is not Schulz’s
focus. Her point is that there is much damaging discourse
about courts that is merely criticism for ulterior purposes not
based on any merit. Media discourse reformulates rather than
reflects reality as the media competes with executive government and the judiciary to represent justice and the common
good. Political and media use of law-and-order rhetoric undermines public confidence in courts and the rule of law that it
masquerades as discussing.
The research on which this book is based is Australian, but
the author includes material from the UK, USA, Canada, India,
and Europe, and the book has a broad international relevance
to foster discussion in this important area. It is scholarly but
readable for general interest, so the book will serve both as a
text for interest as well as a course book in progressive law
schools and communications faculties.
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